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The Supreme Court of South Carolina
In the Matter of Jean Pilgrim, Petitioner 
Appellate Case No. 2015-000383 
ORDER 
The records in the office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court show that on 
November 12, 1980, Petitioner was admitted and enrolled as a member of the 
Bar of this State. 
By way of a letter addressed to Supreme Court of South Carolina, dated 
March 3, 2015, Petitioner submitted her resignation from the South Carolina 
Bar. We accept Petitioner's resignation. 
Petitioner shall, within fifteen (15) days of the issuance of this order, deliver 
to the Clerk of the Supreme Court her certificate to practice law in this State. 
In addition, Petitioner shall promptly notify, or cause to be notified, by 
certified mail, return receipt requested, all clients currently being represented 
in pending matters in this State, of her resignation. 
Petitioner shall file an affidavit with the Clerk of the Supreme Court, within 
fifteen (15) days of the issuance of this order, showing that she has fully 
complied with the provisions of this order.  The resignation of Jean Pilgrim 
shall be effective upon full compliance with this order.  Her name shall be 
removed from the roll of attorneys. 
s/ Jean H. Toal  C.J. 
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 s/ Costa M. Pleicones  J. 
s/ Donald W. Beatty  J. 
s/ John W. Kittredge  J. 
s/ Kaye G. Hearn  J. 
 
Columbia, South Carolina 
March 5, 2015 
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

William C. Mitchell, Petitioner, 
v. 
City of Greenville, Respondent.
Appellate Case No. 2015-000270 
Opinion No. 27506 

Submitted March 3, 2015 – Filed March 12, 2015 

JUDGMENT FOR RESPONDENT
Samuel Darryl Harms, III, of Harms Law Firm, P.A., of 
Greenville, for Petitioner. 
Michael Stuart Pitts, of Greenville, for Respondent. 
PER CURIAM: Petitioner asks this Court to hear this matter seeking declaratory 
and injunctive relief in our original jurisdiction.  Respondent opposes the request. 
We grant the petition for original jurisdiction, dispense with further briefing, and 
grant declaratory relief to respondent.
Petitioner argues respondent has adopted an ordinance that improperly provides for 
two methods of nomination for municipal elections.  Petitioner asks this Court to 
declare the ordinance is null and void, and that the method of election will continue 
to be partisan in the City of Greenville. 
South Carolina Code Ann. § 5-15-60 (2004) allows one of the following methods 
for nominating candidates and determining the results of nonpartisan elections:  (1) 
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the nonpartisan plurality method; (2) the nonpartisan election and run-off method; 
and (3) the nonpartisan primary and general election method.   
The ordinance challenged by petitioner states:  
. . . [t]he city of Greenville shall cease operating under the partisan 
method of nominating and electing candidates in municipal elections.  
The City of Greenville adopts the nonpartisan plurality method as 
authorized by S.C. Code § 5-15-612 (2004). . . . To achieve this 
purpose, Chapter 14, "Nominations and elections," of the City of 
Greenville Code of Ordinances shall be amended to conform with the 
amended language as set forth on the attached exhibit, which is 
incorporated herein, with strikes indicating words which are deleted 
and double underlining indicating added language. 
Greenville, SC Code of Ordinances, Ordinance No. 2014-25 (May 12, 2014).  The 
attachment contains the following in Section 14-2:  "The methods method of 
nomination for municipal elections shall be partisan [nonpartisan plurality / 
nonpartisan run off,] as provided in this chapter and in S.C. Code 1976, § 5-15-10 
et seq. and S.C. Code 1976, tit. 7." Id.
Petitioner argues that, because the attachment to the ordinance indicates the 
method to be used is "nonpartisan plurality / nonpartisan run off," and does not 
choose between the two methods, the ordinance is invalid, and the City must 
conduct partisan elections. We disagree. 
Issues involving the construction of ordinances are reviewed as a matter of law 
under a broader standard of review than is applied in reviewing issues of fact.  
Eagle Container Co., LLC v. Cnty. of Newberry, 379 S.C. 564, 666 S.E.2d 892 
(2008). The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate 
the legislative intent whenever possible. I'On, L.L.C. v. Town of Mt. Pleasant, 338 
S.C. 406, 526 S.E.2d 716 (2000).  When interpreting an ordinance, legislative 
intent must prevail if it can be reasonably discovered in the language used.  
Charleston Cnty. Parks and Recreation Comm'n v. Somers, 319 S.C. 65, 459 
S.E.2d 841 (1995). An ordinance must receive a practical, reasonable, and fair 
interpretation consonant with the purpose, design, and policy of the lawmakers.   
Id.  While the preamble is not a part of the effective portion of a statute, it may 
supply the guide to the meaning of an act.  State v. Alls, 330 S.C. 528, 500 S.E.2d 
781 (1998), citing City of Spartanburg v. Leonard, 180 S.C. 491, 186 S.E. 395 
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(1936). 
Although the attachment appears to avoid selecting a particular method for 
nonpartisan elections, the body of the ordinance clearly indicates the City intended 
to adopt the nonpartisan plurality method. Apparently, the "nonpartisan plurality / 
nonpartisan run off" set forth the options presented to City Council when it was 
deciding which method to adopt, and was not corrected when the ordinance was 
finally adopted. Because the clear legislative intent of the ordinance was to adopt a 
nonpartisan plurality method of elections, the "nonpartisan run off" option is 
deleted from the attachment to the ordinance.  Accordingly, we enter
JUDGMENT FOR RESPONDENT. 
TOAL, C.J., PLEICONES, BEATTY, KITTREDGE and HEARN, JJ., 
concur. 
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

Ann Dreher, Respondent, 
v. 
South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental 
Control, Petitioner. 
Appellate Case No. 2013-000364 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Appeal From The Administrative Law Court
 
Ralph King Anderson III, Administrative Law Judge 

Opinion No. 27507 

Heard November 18, 2014 – Filed March 18, 2015 

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED 
Bradley David Churdar, of N. Charleston, for Petitioner. 
Christopher McG. Holmes, of Mt. Pleasant, for 
Respondent. 
CHIEF JUSTICE TOAL: We granted the South Carolina Department of 
Health and Environmental Control's (DHEC) petition for a writ of certiorari to 
review the court of appeals' decision in Dreher v. South Carolina Department of 
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Health and Environmental Control, 399 S.C. 259, 730 S.E.2d 922 (Ct. App. 2012), 
reversing the Administrative Law Court's (ALC) denial of Ann Dreher's
(Respondent) bridge construction permit application.  We affirm as modified. 
FACTS/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In January 1994, Respondent purchased two parcels of property located on 
Folly Island, South Carolina: 806 East Cooper Avenue, and Tract D.  These lots 
were previously a contiguous tract of high ground property in which the Tract D 
portion abutted the ocean, and the Cooper Avenue portion abutted the roadway.  
However, at some point prior to Respondent's property purchase, two man-made 
canals were constructed, after which Tract D became completely surrounded by 
coastal tidelands and waters. At present, 806 East Cooper Avenue is 
approximately 0.24 acres in size, and Tract D is approximately 0.84 acres in size. 
On April 2, 2009, Respondent filed a permit application with DHEC 
requesting permission to construct a vehicular bridge from 806 East Cooper 
Avenue to Tract D. DHEC denied the application because Regulation 30-
12(N)(2)(c) prohibits the agency from issuing a bridge construction permit to a 
"coastal island" less than two acres in size, and the parties agreed that—if Tract D 
was, in fact, a "coastal island"—it did not meet the regulation's minimum size 
requirement. See S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 30-12(N)(2)(c) (2011).1 
1 Regulation 30-12(N)(2) specifically states: 
(a) The decision on whether to issue or deny a permit for a bridge to a 
coastal island must be made with due consideration of the impacts 
to the public trust lands, critical area, coastal tidelands and coastal 
waters, weighed against the reasonable expectations of the owner 
of the coastal island. Giving due consideration to these factors, 
[DHEC] has determined that some islands are too small or too far 
from upland to warrant the impacts on public resources of bridges 
to these islands, and thus no permit for a bridge shall be issued. 
. . . . 
(c) [DHEC] will not consider applications for bridge access to islands 
less than two acres in size. 
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Respondent requested a contested case hearing before the ALC.  At the 
hearing, the parties focused on whether Tract D met the definition of a "coastal 
island" as described in the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) and the 
regulations promulgated pursuant to the CZMA.  See generally S.C. Code Ann. §§ 
48-39-10 to -360 (2008 & Supp. 2014); S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 30-1 to -21 (2011 & 
Supp. 2014). A "coastal island" is defined as: 
an area of high ground above the critical area delineation that is 
separated from other high ground areas by coastal tidelands or waters.  
An island connected to the mainland or other island only by a 
causeway is also considered a coastal island.  The purpose of this 
definition is to include all islands except those that are essentially 
mainland, i.e., those that already have publicly accessible bridges 
and/or causeways. The following islands shall not be deemed a 
coastal island subject to this section due to their large size and 
developed nature: Waites Island in Horry County; Pawleys Island in 
Georgetown County; Isle of Palms, Sullivans Island, Folly Island, 
Kiawah Island, Seabrook Island, Edisto Island, Johns Island, James 
Island, Woodville Island, Slannn Island and Wadmalaw Island in 
Charleston County; Daniel Island in Berkeley County; Edisto Beach 
in Colleton County; Harbor Island, Hunting Island, Fripp Island, 
Hilton Head Island, St. Helena Island, Port Royal Island, Ladies 
Island, Spring Island and Parris Island in Beaufort County.
S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 30-1(D)(11) (emphasis added).  Because the listed islands 
are not considered "coastal islands," properties on these islands are exempt from
the minimum acreage requirement found in Regulation 30-12(N)(2)(c).  See S.C. 
Code Ann. Regs. 30-12(N)(2)(a), (c) (restricting eligibility for a bridge-building 
permit to those coastal islands that are large enough to warrant the impact on 
public resources). 
Ultimately, the ALC found Tract D "geologically, geographically and by 
legal description, is on and within the boundaries of Folly Island."2  Nonetheless, 
the ALC concluded that Tract D constituted a "coastal island" separate and apart 
2 Similarly, the ALC found that "[t]he proposed bridge was the least 
environmentally damaging alternative for access to Tract D and, in fact, would 
have de minimus environmental impact." 
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from Folly Island.3  Therefore, the ALC upheld DHEC's denial of Respondent's
bridge permit application, finding that "Tract D is less than one acre in size," and 
that "the legislative intent, as evidenced by the language of Regulation 30-1(D)(11) 
and the policies of the CZMA, was to include islands like Tract D in Regulation 
30-1(D)(11)'s definition of 'coastal island.'"4 
Respondent appealed to the court of appeals, and the court of appeals 
reversed the ALC's decision. See Dreher, 399 S.C. at 261, 730 S.E.2d at 923. 
Specifically, the court of appeals found that because DHEC "failed to challenge" 
the ALC's finding that Tract D was part of Folly Island, that finding became the 
law of the case. Id. at 263, 730 S.E.2d at 924. The court of appeals considered this 
fact dispositive, as Folly Island—and thus Tract D—were specifically exempt from
the minimum acreage requirement for a bridge-building permit.  See id. at 264–65,
730 S.E.2d at 925. In the alternative, the court of appeals ruled that on the merits, 
substantial evidence in the record demonstrated that Tract D was part of Folly 
Island, and thus was exempt from the minimum acreage requirement found in 
Regulation 30-12(N)(2)(c). Id. at 263–64, 730 S.E.2d at 924–25. Finally, the 
court of appeals held that because Respondent was not prohibited from building a 
3 The ALC based this conclusion on four reasons.  First, the ALC found that Tract 
D was "an area of high ground about the critical area that is separated from other 
high ground areas by coastal tidelands or waters," and thus technically met the 
definition of a "coastal island."  Second, the ALC determined that unlike the other 
exempt islands listed in Regulation 30-1(D)(11), Tract D was not "essentially 
mainland," and thus the General Assembly did not intend to exempt Tract D from 
the minimum acreage requirement found in Regulation 30-12(N)(2)(c).  Third, the 
ALC similarly concluded that the General Assembly did not intend to include 
parcels such as Tract D in the list of exempt coastal islands because unlike the 
other named islands, Tract D was not "large [in] size and developed [in] nature."  
Finally, the ALC found that building the bridge to Tract D would require building 
in a tidelands area, which the CZMA specifically sought to protect.   
4 Both parties filed timely motions to reconsider.  Of note, DHEC requested the 
ALC reconsider its finding that Tract D "geologically, geographically and by legal 
description, is on and within the boundaries of Folly Island," arguing that the 
finding was inconsistent with the remainder of the ALC's conclusions.  Because the 
ALC did not rule on either party's motion within thirty days, the motions were 
deemed denied. 
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bridge due to Tract D's small size, she was entitled to construct the bridge by virtue 
of Regulation 30-12(F). Id. at 266, 730 S.E.2d at 925–26; see also S.C. Code Ann. 
Regs. 30-12(F) (requiring DHEC to weigh the environmental impact of proposed 
bridges against public safety considerations, and to approve projects that have a 
minimal environmental impact). 
We granted DHEC's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the court of 
appeals' decision. 
ISSUES
I.	 Whether the court of appeals misapplied the law of the case 

doctrine? 

II.	 Whether Tract D is exempt from the minimum acreage 

requirement found in Regulation 30-12(N)(2)(c)? 

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Appellate courts review cases decided by the ALC in accordance with the 
Administrative Procedures Act. Engaging & Guarding Laurens Cnty.'s Env't 
(EAGLE) v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 407 S.C. 334, 341, 755 S.E.2d 
444, 448 (2014) (citing S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-610(B) (Supp. 2012)).  Thus we are 
limited "to determining whether the ALC's findings were supported by substantial 
evidence or were controlled by an error of law."  Id.  An appellate court may not 
substitute its judgment for the judgment of the ALC as to the weight of the 
evidence on questions of fact.  S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-610(B).  "In determining 
whether the [ALC's] decision was supported by substantial evidence, this Court 
need only find, looking at the entire record on appeal, evidence from which 
reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion that the [ALC] reached."  Hill v. 
S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 389 S.C. 1, 9–10, 698 S.E.2d 612, 617 
(2010).
ANALYSIS
I.	 Law of the Case Doctrine 
"An unappealed ruling is the law of the case and requires affirmance."  
Shirley's Iron Works, Inc. v. City of Union, 403 S.C. 560, 573, 743 S.E.2d 778, 785 
(2013). Thus, should the appealing party fail to raise all of the grounds upon 
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which a lower court's decision was based, those unappealed findings—whether 
correct or not—become the law of the case. Cf. Judy v. Martin, 381 S.C. 455, 458, 
674 S.E.2d 151, 153 (2009) ("Under the law-of-the-case doctrine, a party is 
precluded from relitigating . . . , [inter alia,] matters that were [] not raised on 
appeal, but should have been . . . .").5 
Moreover, because an appellate court may affirm the lower court's decision
for any reason appearing in the record, the prevailing party may—but is not 
required to—raise additional sustaining grounds to support the lower court's 
decision. See Rule 220(c), SCACR; see also I'On, L.L.C. v. Town of Mt. Pleasant, 
338 S.C. 406, 417, 420, 526 S.E.2d 716, 722, 723 (2000) ("In raising an additional 
sustaining ground in an appeal, the party who prevailed in the lower court urges an 
appellate court to affirm the lower court's ruling for a reason other than one 
primarily relied upon by the lower court.").  Thus, "it is not necessary for the party 
who prevailed below to object to or appeal from the trial court's ruling in order to 
raise such grounds." I'On, 338 S.C. at 418, 526 S.E.2d at 722. 
Here, the court of appeals found that DHEC—the prevailing party before the 
ALC—should have secured a ruling from the ALC reversing its finding that Tract 
D was "geologically, geographically and by legal description, [] on and within the 
boundaries of Folly Island," and that because DHEC failed to do so, this finding 
became the law of the case.  However, the court of appeals misapprehended the 
law of the case doctrine. Specifically, the court of appeals erred in applying the 
doctrine so as to bar the prevailing party below from raising an additional 
sustaining ground. DHEC properly raised its challenge to the ALC's finding in its 
brief to the court of appeals, and thus did not concede or abandon the argument.  
See id. at 420, 526 S.E.2d at 723. Therefore, rather than find the argument 
procedurally barred, the court of appeals should have considered whether Tract D 
is a "coastal island" as defined in the regulations.
II. Coastal Island Exemption 
DHEC asserts that because Tract D is surrounded by coastal tidelands and 
waters, it is a "coastal island" under Regulation 30-1(D)(11).  Further, DHEC 
5 To the extent an appellate court relies on the law of the case doctrine, the 
appellate decision affirms the lower court's decision procedurally, rather than on 
the merits. 
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argues that Tract D essentially ceased to be a part of Folly Island as a result of the 
creation of the man-made canals that separate Tract D from 806 East Cooper 
Avenue. In contrast, Respondent does not dispute that Tract D is surrounded by 
coastal tidelands and waters, but rather contends that because Tract D remains 
within the geographical and legal boundaries of Folly Island, it is expressly exempt 
from being considered a "coastal island."  As the ALC aptly expressed, "This 
decision [] centers on whether the legislature intended that its declaration of Folly 
Island as [exempt from the general definition of a 'coastal island'] overrides its 
declaration that a coastal island is simply high ground which is 'separated from
other high ground areas by coastal tidelands or waters.'"  In other words, the issue 
here is purely an issue of regulatory interpretation. 
Generally, "[a] specific statutory provision prevails over a more general 
one." Wooten ex rel. Wooten v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 333 S.C. 464, 468, 511 
S.E.2d 355, 357 (1999); see also Converse Power Corp. v. S.C. Dep't of Health & 
Envtl. Control, 350 S.C. 39, 47–48, 564 S.E.2d 341, 346 (Ct. App. 2002) 
(employing the rules of statutory construction to discern the meaning of a 
regulation). Here, Regulation 30-1(D)(11) broadly defines "coastal islands," but 
then specifically exempts certain islands, including Folly Island, from the general 
definition. See S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 30-1(D)(11).  Further, the ALC found that 
Tract D was "on and within" Folly Island, and as detailed in the court of appeals'
opinion, that finding is supported by substantial evidence in the record.  See
Dreher, 399 S.C. at 263–64, 730 S.E.2d at 924–25 (outlining the facts in the record 
demonstrating that Tract D is part of Folly Island).  As such, we agree with 
Respondent that Tract D is not a "coastal island" in and of itself; rather, it is part of 
Folly Island, which is specifically exempted in the regulation.
Accordingly, the specific regulatory exemption for Folly Island controls
over the more general regulatory definition of "coastal island."  As a result, Tract D 
cannot be considered a "coastal island," and the minimum acreage requirement 
found in Regulation 30-12(N)(2)(c) does not bar Respondent's bridge construction 
permit application.  In conjunction with Regulation 30-12(F) and the ALC's 
finding that "[t]he proposed bridge was the least environmentally damaging 
alternative for access to Tract D and, in fact, would have de minimus 
environmental impact," we find that DHEC and the ALC erred in denying 
Respondent's permit application.  Cf. S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 30-12(F) (outlining the 
environmental impact standards DHEC should consider prior to granting a bridge-
building permit).
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CONCLUSION
 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the result reached by the court of 
appeals, albeit through different reasoning. 
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED. 
KITTREDGE and BEATTY, JJ., concur. PLEICONES, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part in a separate opinion in which 
HEARN, J., concurs. 
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JUSTICE PLEICONES:  I concur in part and dissent in part.  I agree with the 
majority that the Court of Appeals misapplied the law of the case doctrine.  I 
disagree, however, with the majority's decision to uphold the Court of Appeals' 
reversal of the ALC's denial of respondent's permit request.   
The majority acknowledges that whether Tract D is entitled to share Folly Island's  
coastal island exemption found in S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 30-1(D)(11) (2011) is a 
question of fact, which is reviewed under the substantial evidence standard.  While 
the majority views the factual issue as whether Tract D is a "part" of Folly Island 
or "on and within" that island, in my view the question is whether there is 
substantial evidence to support the ALC's finding that the tract is itself a coastal 
island. Whether a parcel located within the geographic boundaries of a named 
island is itself a separate coastal island within the meaning of Reg. 30-1(D)(11), or 
whether it is not and therefore shares the named island's exemption, is a question of 
fact. Risher v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 393 S.C. 198, 210, 712 
S.E.2d 428, 434 (2011) ("whether or not the Lot is part of Fripp Island is not a 
legal question that is determined under the rubric of a regulation; instead, it is a 
finding of fact properly left within the purview of the fact finding body, and only 
reversible if unsupported by substantial evidence").  
In Risher, we found substantial evidence supported the ALC's findings that the lot 
located within the geographic boundaries of Fripp Island did not meet the 
definition of coastal island under the regulation, and that it was therefore within 
Fripp's exemption.  Here, as all parties admit, Tract D is entirely surrounded by 
"coastal tidelands or waters" and is therefore a coastal island as defined by Reg. 
30-1(D)(11). The ALC's finding that Tract D is not within Folly Island's
exemption is supported by substantial evidence.  Risher, supra. In my opinion, the 
Court of Appeals erred in reversing the ALC, and the majority also errs by 
focusing on Tract D's location rather than on its topography. Id. 
Even if the majority's view prevails, and the ALC's decision finding Tract D to be a 
coastal island is reversed, it does not follow that respondent is automatically 
entitled to the bridge permit she seeks.  Instead, the matter should be remanded to 
DHEC for consideration of the permit request in light of the requirements of S.C. 
Code Ann. Regs. 30-12(F) (2011), an issue which has not yet been litigated. 
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For the reasons given above, I concur in part and dissent in part. 
HEARN, J., concurs. 
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

The Spriggs Group, P.C., Respondent, 
v. 
Gene R. Slivka, Petitioner. 
Appellate Case No. 2013-000800 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Appeal from Colleton County 

William H. Seals, Jr., Circuit Court Judge 

Opinion No. 27508 

Heard February 3, 2015 – Filed March 18, 2015 

DEPUBLISH THE OPINION OF THE COURT OF
 
APPEALS AND DISMISS CERTIORARI AS 

IMPROVIDENTLY GRANTED 

Robert T. Lyles, Jr., of Lyles & Lyles, L.L.C., of 
Charleston, for Petitioner. 
James Atkinson Bruorton, IV and Timothy James Wood 
Muller, of Rosen Rosen & Hagood, L.L.C., of 
Charleston, for Respondent.
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PER CURIAM:  We granted the petition for a writ of certiorari to review the 
Court of Appeals' decision in The Spriggs Group, P.C. v. Slivka, 402 S.C. 42, 738 
S.E.2d 495 (Ct. App. 2013). We first direct the Court of Appeals to depublish its 
opinion and assign the matter an unpublished opinion number. The above opinion 
shall no longer have any precedential effect.  Next, we dismiss as improvidently 
granted the writ of certiorari. 
Accordingly, we 
DEPUBLISH THE OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS AND 
DISMISS CERTIORARI AS IMPROVIDENTLY GRANTED. 
TOAL, C.J., PLEICONES, BEATTY, KITTREDGE and HEARN, JJ., 
concur. 
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

LeAndra Lewis, Petitioner, 
v. 
L.B. Dynasty, d/b/a Boom Boom Room Studio 54 and 
S.C. Uninsured Employers' Fund, Defendants, 
Of Whom S.C. Uninsured Employers' Fund is, 

Respondent. 

Appellate Case No. 2012-213376 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Appeal from The Workers' Compensation Commission 
Opinion No. 27509 

Heard January 14, 2015 – Filed March 18, 2015 

REVERSED AND REMANDED 
Charles B. Burnette, III, of Burnette & Payne, PA, of 
Rock Hill; John S. Nichols and Blake A. Hewitt, both of 
Bluestein, Nichols, Thompson & Delgado, LLC, of 
Columbia, for Petitioner. 
Lisa C. Glover, of Columbia, for Respondent. 
 JUSTICE HEARN: LeAndra Lewis was injured by an errant bullet at 
Studio 54 Boom Boom Room (the Club) while she was working as an exotic 
dancer. The question before the Court is whether she is an employee of the Club 
and thus eligible for workers' compensation.  Considering the relationship in toto, 
we find the Club exercised control over the manner in which she performed her 
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work and therefore conclude she was an employee. 
FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Lewis worked as an exotic dancer, performing five to seven days a week. 
Lewis traveled throughout North and South Carolina to dance at different 
establishments, and performed at the Club on three separate occasions.  Upon 
arrival at the Club, Lewis presented identification demonstrating she was old 
enough to perform, reviewed the Club's rule sheet, and paid a tip-out fee.  The tip-
out fee, which was determined based on when her shift started, was $70.   
The types of dances Lewis performed at the Club included V.I.P. dances,
table dances, and dances on the stage.  Lewis was required to perform V.I.P. 
dances whenever a patron requested one.  The Club set the minimum price of these 
dances, which were to be performed in a specific area, and Lewis had to give a 
portion of that payment to the Club. Lewis's rotation on stage was determined by 
the Club and it chose the music for those performances.   
  The Club required the performers to follow specific guidelines or risk being 
fined or immediately discharged.  Because this Club was topless only, the dancers 
were subject to fines for removing their panties.  Although the Club did not set 
times when the dancers were required to work, it did devise a dancing schedule 
once the women arrived and they were not allowed to leave prior to the end of their 
shift without paying a fine. Furthermore, if a dancer did not perform on stage 
during the assigned time, she had to pay a fine.  Failure to pay any fine or repeated 
violations of the rules could result in termination.  Additionally, the dancers could 
be dismissed for fighting or having sex in the Club.
During Lewis's shift at the Club, a fight broke out and Lewis was struck in 
the abdomen by a stray bullet, which caused severe damage to her internal organs 
and resulted in the loss of a kidney. She also sustained substantial scarring. Lewis
filed a claim for workers' compensation requesting temporary total disability 
benefits and medical treatment from the date of the accident.  The putative 
employer was not represented at the hearing, but the South Carolina Uninsured 
Employer's Fund appeared to dispute Lewis's claim, arguing Lewis was an 
independent contractor and not an employee.   
At the hearing, Lewis argued the Club exercised control over the manner in 
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which her work was performed, and she was therefore an employee of the Club.
She testified she earned $357 the night she was shot, and made a total of $1,357 at 
the Club over the course of her shifts. Lewis did not state what her income was at
the other establishments where she danced, but stated she made approximately
$250 to $350 a night.  She had never filed a tax return and produced no 
documentation indicating where she worked or what her total income was.  
The single commissioner found that Lewis was an independent contractor 
and denied compensation.  Additionally, the commissioner stated that had Lewis 
established she was an employee, her compensation rate would be $75 per week 
based on Lewis's failure to produce evidence of the income she earned at other
establishments. The appellate panel of the Workers' Compensation Commission 
affirmed, adopting the single commissioner's order.  
On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed in a split decision.  Lewis v. L.B. 
Dynasty, Inc., 400 S.C. 129, 732 S.E.2d 662 (Ct. App. 2012).  The majority found 
that Lewis was an independent contractor, and thus the court did not have to reach 
the question of whether the commissioner erred in setting her compensation rate at 
$75 per week. Id. at 137, 732 S.E.2d at 666. Judge Short dissented, concluding 
that examining the relationship as a whole, the Club exercised sufficient control to 
evince an employment relationship.  Id. at 139, 732 S.E.2d at 667 (Short, J., 
dissenting). We granted certiorari. 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
Did the court of appeals err in finding Lewis was an independent contractor, 
not an employee of the Club? 
LAW/ANALYSIS 
Lewis argues the details of her professional relationship preponderate in 
favor of finding she was an employee of the Club and the court of appeals erred in 
concluding otherwise. We agree. 
We construe workers' compensation law liberally in favor of coverage to
further the beneficent purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act; accordingly, 
only exceptions and restrictions to coverage are strictly construed.  James v. Anne's
Inc., 390 S.C. 188, 198, 701 S.E.2d 730, 735 (2010).  The burden of proving the 
relationship of employer and employee is upon the claimant, and this proof must 
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be made by the greater weight of the evidence.  Marlow v. E. L. Jones & Son, Inc., 
248 S.C. 568, 570, 151 S.E.2d 747, 748 (1966).  Whether a claimant is an 
employee or independent contractor is a jurisdictional question and therefore the 
Court may take its own view of the preponderance of the evidence.  Wilkinson ex 
rel. Wilkinson v. Palmetto State Transp. Co., 382 S.C. 295, 299, 676 S.E.2d 700, 
702 (2009). The crux of this determination is the purported employer's right to
control the claimant in the performance of his work.  Id.  In analyzing the nature of 
a work relationship the Court examines four factors: (1) direct evidence of the right 
or exercise of control; (2) furnishing of equipment; (3) method of payment; (4) 
right to fire. Shatto v. McLeod Reg'l Med. Ctr., 406 S.C. 470, 475–76, 753 S.E.2d 
416, 419 (2013). Each factor is considered with equal force and the mere presence 
of one factor indicating an employment relationship is not dispositive of the 
inquiry.  Id. 
At the outset, we agree with Lewis that the majority of the court of appeals
allowed its analysis to be influenced by the initial conclusion that Lewis was an 
"itinerant artistic performer."  Lewis, 400 S.C. at 134, 732 S.E.2d at 664.  While we 
recognize the unique details of the arrangement between the Club and Lewis, we
emphasize our inquiry is a balance of factors based on the totality of the
circumstances.  Attempting to broadly characterize the nature of her profession 
prior to engagement in the analysis foretells a single result.  The question before 
the Court is a simple, fact-based consideration—did the Club exercise sufficient 
control over Lewis to create an employee relationship—further commentary on the 
nature of her profession is unnecessary.  We therefore now proceed to the right to 
control test. 
I. RIGHT TO OR EXERCISE OF CONTROL 
Turning to the first prong of the test, we find the facts preponderate in favor 
of an employment relationship.  In considering this question, the court of appeals 
focused on whether the Club dictated how she danced and concluded that because 
Lewis could choreograph her own routine, the Club did not control her work.  We 
find this a myopic view in light of the facts presented.  Certainly, the Club did not 
specify all the details of her movements, but it is unfaithful to the record to claim it
did not control her performance in her capacity as an entertainer.  Prior to working 
her shift, Lewis was required to pay a tip-out fee, undergo a search, and review the 
Club's rule sheet. The Club could decline her entry if her appearance was
undesirable.  Once Lewis began her shift, the Club chose the music for all her 
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performances.  It also dictated when in the rotation of dancers she must appear on 
stage. The Club set the minimum for a V.I.P. dance—which she was required to 
perform if asked—and specified an area for those to take place.  Although Lewis 
technically performed routines of her own direction, the Club specified her degree 
of nudity—she was required to be topless, but would be fined for removing more. 
Additionally, she was not permitted to leave her shift early without paying a fine.   
We recognize that Lewis had no set schedule, and came when she chose 
with no other repercussion than the loss of income.  Nevertheless, once the Club 
engaged her for the evening, it exercised significant control over the performance 
of her work. Accordingly, we find this factor weighs in favor of a finding of an 
employment relationship.
II. FURNISHING OF EQUIPMENT 
We further agree with Lewis that the Club furnished equipment so as to 
preponderate this factor in favor of her having an employee relationship.   
When considering this prong, the court of appeals concluded the Club did 
"nothing more than allow [Lewis] on the premises" because there was no practical
way she could have supplied the poles, stage, furniture, or bar items.  Instead, it 
stated, "From the standpoint of both the [Club] and its customers, Lewis brought
her own 'equipment' for her work."  Lewis, 400 S.C. at 135, 732 S.E.2d at 665. 
Initially, we disagree with the court of appeals that an individual's body can 
be considered equipment for the purpose of this analysis.  See Matter of Hanson, 
754 P.2d 444, 447 (Idaho 1988) ("The worker's body is not a major item of 
equipment within the meaning of the third element of the 'right to control' test.
Major items of equipment include such things as tools, machinery, special
clothing, parts, and other similar items necessary for the worker to accomplish the 
task to be performed.  For example, a plumber, hired to perform plumbing repairs 
on a building, usually brings the tools, the parts, and often special equipment in the 
form of augers, pipe cutters and threaders, etc., in order to perform the service. 
Those are the sorts of items which constitute the 'major items of equipment' under 
the third element of the right to control test.  The fact that the plumber also
supplies the body doing the work is true whether he is acting as an employee or as 
an independent contractor."). 
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Furthermore, assuming her body is equipment is inconsistent with the 
rationale underlying the Court's consideration of this factor.  As Professor Larson 
has written: 
When it is the employer who furnishes the equipment, the inference of
the right to control is a matter of common sense and business.  The 
owner of a $100,000 truck who entrusts it to a driver is naturally 
going to dictate details such as speed, maintenance, and the like in 
order to protect his or her investment . . . . 
This being the rationale, the rule should not be applied to items 
of equipment whose size and value are not so large as to provide this 
incentive for control and for efficient employment of capital.  
3 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 61.01 
(2013). The genesis of this consideration is that whomever bears the risk of the 
capital in any investment would logically exert the most control over how that 
investment is used.   
We observe that other than her costume, Lewis brought no other equipment 
to the Club. The Club, however, supplied her necessary performance space— 
including an area for V.I.P. dances, a stage with a pole, tables, and a sound system. 
It therefore had a more significant interest in ensuring the dancers effectively 
utilized the equipment provided to ensure the advertised experience was available
to the patrons. See Terry v. Sapphire Gentlemen's Club, 336 P.3d 951, 959 (Nev. 
2014) ("With regard to the relative investment of the parties, we note that Sapphire 
provides all the risk capital, funds advertising, and covers facility expenses. The 
performers' financial contributions are limited to . . . their costume and appearance-
related expenses and house fees. Thus, the performers are far more closely akin to 
wage earners toiling for a living, than to independent entrepreneurs seeking a 
return on their risky capital investments." (internal quotation omitted)).  Because 
the Club, and not Lewis, bore the risk of the capital investment in the equipment 
used by Lewis to perform her work, we find this factor weighs in favor of an 
employee relationship.   
III. METHOD OF PAYMENT 
Lewis argues this prong of the analysis provides little assistance in analyzing 
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the nature of her professional relationship.  We recognize at the outset the facts of 
this case are distinct in that the Club did not directly pay her any of her earnings;
instead, it facilitated the payment she received from the customers.  Nevertheless, 
we do not agree this factor is irrelevant to our inquiry.  
When considering this prong, typically a court looks to whether the claimant 
was paid by the job or by the hour and how the claimant filed her taxes.  Here, 
Lewis never filed her taxes and does not appear to have ever been given a Form 
1099 or a W-2. We therefore again find it helpful to turn to Professor Larson's 
discussion of the rationale underlying this consideration:
A moment's reflection will show the realistic connection between
payment and control.  If an employer in a regular business or industry 
purchases personal labor by the hour, day, or week, it is almost certain 
to insist on the right to see that the time is well and efficiently spent.
It if pays by the hour, the employer wants to see that it gets a full
hours work, and that the hour is applied where it is most needed.  . . . 
By contrast, if the employer makes an agreement to pay a man 
one hundred dollars to clean out a well, it has no reason to care 
whether the worker is slow or fast, clumsy or efficient. 
3 Larson's, § 61.06. Accordingly, the payment prong reflects the putative 
employer's interest in a worker's productivity and efficiency and whether it would 
indicate the retention of control over the manner in which the job is performed.    
We note the Club exerted some control over her payment; it set the price of 
the tip-out fee and the minimum for V.I.P. dances, providing Lewis no discretion 
to alter these amounts.  Additionally, it required Lewis to perform these V.I.P. 
dances upon request from a customer.  Nevertheless, on the balance we agree with 
the court of appeals' conclusion that this factor does not does not suggest the 
exercise of control of the Club; therefore, we find this factor preponderates in favor 
of an independent contractor relationship. 
IV. RIGHT TO FIRE 
In considering the right to fire, we are aware that in any relationship there 
exists some right to terminate the arrangement.  However, as this Court has 
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previously noted, "[t]he power to fire, it is often said, is the power to control.  The
absolute right to terminate the relationship without liability is not consistent with 
the concept of independent contract, under which the contractor should have the 
legal right to complete the project."  Shatto, 406 S.C. at 481, 753 S.E.2d at 422 
(quoting 3 Larson's § 61.08[1]). In essence, examining this factor requires the 
Court to look to whether liability exists if the work is prematurely interrupted.  We
find the Club ultimately had the right to terminate Lewis without risk of 
repercussions. Accordingly, we find this factor weighs in favor of an employment 
relationship. 
The testimony at the hearing indicates Lewis would be fined for a failure to 
comply with the rules—including not staying for her rotation in stage 
performances, leaving before her shift was over, and declining to perform a V.I.P.
dance. Failure to pay any fine would result in her termination.  She could also be
fired for continuously breaking the rules, fighting, or improper hygiene.  The Club 
could even decline to let her in for not having the desired appearance.  We
acknowledge she had the right not to show up at all because she had no set 
schedule, but once she was hired for the night, the Club could end that relationship 
prior to her shift ending and leave Lewis with no recourse for that firing.
On balance, we find this prong indicates an employee relationship.  Lewis 
could be terminated for violations of the company rules and could be prevented 
from working at the Club's discretion.  Additionally, there is no indication Lewis 
would possess any right to relief if she was terminated.   
CONCLUSION 
We emphasize our analysis is necessarily driven by the particular facts of 
this case. Examining the totality of the circumstances, we hold the weight of the
evidence weighs in favor of finding Lewis was an employee of the Club and is
entitled to workers' compensation benefits.  We therefore reverse the court of 
appeals' opinion holding the contrary. Additionally, because it declined to address 
the question of Lewis's compensation rate, we remand that issue to the court of 
appeals for consideration. 
TOAL, C.J., BEATTY and KITTREDGE JJ., concur.  PLEICONES, J., 
dissenting in a separate opinion.
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 JUSTICE PLEICONES:  I respectfully dissent as I agree with the analysis and 
holding of the Court of Appeals and thus, would dismiss the writ of certiorari as 
improvidently granted. 
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina 
RE: Amendment to the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules  
O R D E R 
Pursuant to Article V, § 4 of the South Carolina Constitution, the South Carolina 
Appellate Court Rules are amended to add the attached rule.  This amendment 
shall be effective immediately.   
s/ Jean H. Toal C.J. 
s/ Costa M. Pleicones J. 
s/ Donald W. Beatty J. 
s/ John W. Kittredge J. 
s/ Kaye G. Hearn J. 
Columbia, South Carolina 
March 11, 2015 
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RULE 610 

BULK DISTRIBUTION OF AND COMPILED 

 INFORMATION FROM JUDICIAL RECORDS 

(a) For the purpose of this rule: 
(1) Bulk distribution is defined as a distribution of all, or a significant
subset, of the information in judicial records, as is and without
modification or compilation.
(2) Compiled information is defined as information that is derived 
from the selection, aggregation or reformulation of the information 
from more than one individual judicial record.
(3) Judicial records shall include all records maintained by any 
court, commission, board, committee, office or other entity within the 
South Carolina Judicial Department, regardless of whether that entity 
is funded in whole or part by state or local funds.  
(b) 	 Unless authorized by the Supreme Court of South Carolina, a bulk 
distribution of judicial records will not be made. 
(c) 	 Unless authorized by the Supreme Court of South Carolina, compiled 
information from judicial records will not be provided.  This restriction shall 
not apply to:
(1) 	 Compiled information that may be contained in statistical or 
other reports that have been previously released to the general 
public. 
(2) 	 Compiled information that can be obtained by a person using 
the search functions available to the public on websites 
maintained by the South Carolina Judicial Department. 
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 

The State, Respondent, 
v. 
Conrad Lamont Slocumb, Appellant. 
Appellate Case No. 2013-000933 
Appeal From Richland County 

DeAndrea G. Benjamin, Circuit Court Judge 

Opinion No. 5303 

Heard January 6, 2015 – Filed March 18, 2015 

AFFIRMED 
Appellate Defender Laura Ruth Baer, of Columbia, for 
Appellant. 
Attorney General Alan M. Wilson, Assistant Attorney 
General Mark R. Farthing, and Solicitor Daniel E. 
Johnson, all of Columbia, for Respondent. 
SHORT, J.:  Conrad Lamont Slocumb appeals his aggregate sentence of one 
hundred thirty years for offenses he committed when he was a juvenile, arguing it 
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is the functional equivalent of a life sentence without parole and violates the Eighth 
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.  We affirm. 
FACTS
For offenses committed in 1996, Slocumb was convicted of first-degree burglary, 
first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC 1st), kidnapping, escape, and robbery.  
At the time the crimes were committed, Slocumb was sixteen years old.  
The Honorable James W. Johnson, Jr., sentenced Slocumb to three terms of life 
imprisonment without parole for burglary, CSC 1st, and kidnapping based on a 
prior 1993 conviction for CSC 1st. Judge Johnson also sentenced Slocumb to 
consecutive terms of fifteen years for robbery and five years for escape.  Slocumb 
appealed and in State v. Slocumb, 336 S.C. 619, 521 S.E.2d 507 (Ct. App. 1999), 
this court affirmed his convictions. Our supreme court denied Slocumb's petition 
for certiorari on June 7, 2000. 
While his direct appeal was pending, Slocumb filed post-conviction relief (PCR) 
actions challenging his 1993 convictions.  On November 8, 1999, our supreme 
court granted relief and found the trial court was without jurisdiction to accept 
Slocumb's 1993 plea.  Slocumb v. State, 337 S.C. 46, 50, 522 S.E.2d 809, 811 
(1999). In granting PCR, the court found a criminal sexual conduct charge 
committed by a juvenile under the age of fourteen was not transferrable to general 
sessions under the statute prevailing at the time. Id.  That plea was the basis for the 
life sentences Slocumb received under South Carolina's recidivist statute.  See S.C. 
Code Ann. § 17-25-45 (2014) (providing for the imposition of a life sentence on an 
offender convicted of certain prior crimes). 
Slocumb appeared before Judge Johnson again on March 16, 2000, and was 
resentenced to life imprisonment for burglary, thirty years for kidnapping, thirty 
years for CSC 1st, fifteen years for robbery, and five years for escape.  All terms 
were to be consecutively served. This court vacated the sentences on March 16, 
2000, for lack of jurisdiction because there remained matters pending on Slocumb's 
direct appeal. Slocumb again appeared before Judge Johnson on February 18, 
2004, and was resentenced to life imprisonment for burglary, thirty years for 
kidnapping, thirty years for CSC 1st, fifteen years for robbery, and five years for 
escape.  All terms were to be consecutively served.  
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On January 26, 2011, Slocumb filed a Motion for Resentencing in the South 
Carolina circuit court, requesting to be resentenced in accordance with Graham v. 
Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010), which held that life without parole is 
unconstitutional when imposed on juvenile nonhomicide offenders.1  At the time, 
Slocumb had a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pending in the United States 
District Court. The Honorable Henry M. Herlong, Jr., Senior United States District 
Judge, adopted the report of the Honorable Bristow Marchant, United States 
Magistrate Judge, and ordered Slocumb's habeas petition be granted on the issue of 
whether he was entitled to have his life sentence for burglary vacated pursuant to 
Graham. The order directed Slocumb "be returned to the state sentencing court for 
resentencing" on the burglary sentence. The remainder of Slocumb's claims were 
dismissed without prejudice. 
In response to the United States District Court order, Slocumb filed a "Bench Brief 
in Support of a Reduced Sentence in Light of Graham v. Florida and Implications 
of De Facto Life Sentences" with the circuit court.  In the brief and at his 
resentencing hearing before the Honorable DeAndrea G. Benjamin, Slocumb 
argued he should be resentenced on all charges rather than just the burglary charge 
because his term-of-years sentence was the functional equivalent of a life sentence.   
Slocumb argued his aggregate sentence of eighty years required him to serve time 
beyond his life expectancy of sixty-seven years.  He further argued the cumulative 
sentence could not be reconciled with Graham, which requires a meaningful 
opportunity for release.  Slocumb was thirty-three years old at the time of the 
hearing. 
In response to Judge Benjamin's query, Slocumb's counsel acknowledged the 
district court's order solely addressed the burglary charge.  Judge Benjamin 
resentenced Slocumb to fifty years on the burglary conviction, consecutive, and 
left the remaining sentences intact.  This appeal followed. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In criminal cases, this court reviews errors of law only and is bound by the trial 
court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous.  State v. Edwards, 384 
S.C. 504, 508, 682 S.E.2d 820, 822 (2009). Thus, on review, the court is limited to 
1 Slocumb alleges no court has yet ruled on this motion.
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determining whether the trial court abused its discretion.  Id.  An abuse of 
discretion occurs when the court's decision is unsupported by the evidence or 
controlled by an error of law. State v. Black, 400 S.C. 10, 16, 732 S.E.2d 880, 884 
(2012). "This [c]ourt does not re-evaluate the facts based on its own view of the 
preponderance of the evidence but simply determines whether the trial court's 
ruling is supported by any evidence." Edwards, 384 S.C. at 508, 682 S.E.2d at 
822. 
LAW/ANALYSIS 
Slocumb argues the circuit court erred in failing to find his aggregate sentence of 
one hundred and thirty years for nonhomicide offenses is the functional equivalent 
of a life sentence without parole because it does not afford him any "meaningful 
opportunity to obtain release" within his lifetime in violation of Graham and the 
Eighth Amendment.  We disagree. 
The general rule is the circuit court has no jurisdiction to reconsider a criminal 
matter once the term of court has expired.  State v. Warren, 392 S.C. 235, 238, 708 
S.E.2d 234, 235 (Ct. App. 2011). "[A] trial judge has no jurisdiction to review his 
own sentences and substitute sentences after adjournment of the court."  State v. 
Patterson, 272 S.C. 2, 4, 249 S.E.2d 770, 770 (1978) (citing State v. Best, 257 S.C. 
361, 186 S.E.2d 272 (1972)). 
"Th[is] rule has two exceptions: a timely post-trial motion and a motion for a new 
trial based on after-discovered evidence." State v. Campbell, 376 S.C. 212, 215, 
656 S.E.2d 371, 373 (2008) (distinguishing jurisdiction from subject matter 
jurisdiction and explaining a trial judge is without the power to act under the 
general rule despite the existence of subject matter jurisdiction).  Furthermore, the 
circuit court on remand has only the jurisdiction and authority mandated by the 
appellate court. Prince v. Beaufort Mem'l Hosp., 392 S.C. 599, 605, 709 S.E.2d 
122, 125 (Ct. App. 2011); see S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Basnight, 346 S.C. 241, 
250-51, 551 S.E.2d 274, 279 (Ct. App. 2001) (stating the "trial court has no 
authority to exceed the mandate of the appellate court on remand").  
Although review of Slocumb's burglary sentence was directed to the circuit court 
from the federal district court rather than one of our state appellate courts, we find 
the circuit court was likewise bound by the district court's directive.  In this case, 
the directive included only reconsideration of the sentence for the burglary 
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conviction. The district court dismissed Slocumb's remaining issues in his habeas 
petition without prejudice. Slocumb informed the circuit court that an independent 
motion in state court to reconsider all of Slocumb's convictions remained pending.  
We find no error by Judge Benjamin in refusing to entertain Slocumb's request to 
reconsider sentencing on all of his convictions.
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the order on appeal is 
AFFIRMED. 

HUFF and KONDUROS, JJ., concur. 
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LOCKEMY, J.:  This case arises out of the disappearance of Portia Washington 
and her granddaughter, Angelica Livingston (collectively, the victims).  The 
victims were last seen on June 10, 2006.  Their bodies have never been recovered.  
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The State indicted Kenneth Lynch with grand larceny of Portia's car and with the 
murder of the victims.  Lynch was convicted as indicted following a bench trial 
before the Honorable Eugene C. Griffith, Jr.  The State sought the death penalty; 
however, the trial court sentenced Lynch to two terms of life imprisonment without 
the possibility of parole for the murders and ten years' imprisonment for grand 
larceny. Lynch appeals his convictions, arguing the trial court erred in (1) denying 
his motion for a directed verdict because the State failed to present substantial 
circumstantial evidence of his guilt; (2) not giving a jury instruction regarding how 
to use and evaluate circumstantial evidence; and (3) not suppressing evidence 
seized during his arrest because the arrest warrant was not supported by probable 
cause. We affirm. 
FACTS
A. The State's Case 
At trial, Linda Miller, Portia's friend, testified the victims lived together and Portia 
was Angelica's caretaker.  Miller explained Portia enjoyed her job at Bob Bennett 
Ford, where she worked as a custodian.  Portia had recently purchased a new car, 
which she loved. While working at Bob Bennett Ford, Portia developed a romantic 
relationship with Lynch, a fellow co-worker.  According to Miller, Portia and 
Lynch were living together in June 2006, when the victims disappeared.  Miller 
explained that before Portia met Lynch she was happy but that began to change.  
Miller admitted she had never met Lynch.  Miller stated the last time she saw the 
victims was on Friday, June 9, 2006, and on that day, Portia did not tell her she 
was planning to take a trip. 
Shyla Andrews, the victims' hair stylist, stated she last saw the victims on 
Saturday, June 10, 2006, when they were scheduled for a hair appointment.  
Andrews testified that on that day, Portia was acting nervous and was in a hurry to 
leave. Andrews stated Portia developed into a nervous person when she began 
dating Lynch, and she advised Portia to end the relationship.  According to 
Andrews, Portia had a close relationship with her family, and she would not 
disappear without telling them where she was going.   
Lela Green, another friend of Portia's, stated Portia called her on Saturday, June 10, 
2006, around 6:00 p.m. and told her she was going to the grocery store to buy food 
to cook for Sunday lunch.  Green stated she planned to have lunch with Portia on 
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Sunday, June 11, 2006, but she never saw Portia again.  According to Green, Portia 
enjoyed her job, and she never told her she was planning to leave South Carolina. 
Carla Perry, Portia and Lynch's neighbor, testified she last saw the victims on the 
afternoon of Saturday, June 10, 2006.  According to Perry, Portia was unloading 
laundry from her car, which was parked outside the apartment, and Lynch was with 
Portia standing outside the car. Perry further stated Angelica came by her 
apartment that afternoon wearing a wet bathing suit and appeared to have been 
swimming at the apartment complex's swimming pool.  According to Perry, around 
10:30 p.m. that night, she noticed Portia's car was missing and Portia's plants were 
outside her apartment, which Perry found strange because Portia always brought 
her plants inside on Saturday night. 
Sallie Jones, Portia's mother, testified she had a close relationship with Portia and 
they talked every day. Jones claimed Portia loved Angelica, her job, and her new 
car. According to Jones, Portia would not allow anyone to drive her car, and Portia 
had given her the spare set of keys to her car and told her she did not want Lynch 
driving it.  Jones, however, admitted that Lynch had previously driven Portia's car 
to drop off Angelica at her house.  Jones explained that before Portia met Lynch, 
she was very happy and enjoyed spending time with her family; however, she 
became less involved with her family after meeting Lynch.  Jones stated Portia had 
never gone more than one week without calling her.  Jones stated Portia did not 
like to drive on the interstate and she rarely traveled outside South Carolina.  Jones 
testified Portia planned to meet her on Sunday, June 11, 2006, but she never heard 
from her after Saturday, June 10, 2006.     
Vernelle Bellamy, Portia's aunt, testified she last saw Portia on Saturday, June 10, 
2006. After she had not heard from Portia for several days, she went to Portia's
apartment and spoke with the apartment manager.  Bellamy stated the apartment 
manager entered Portia's apartment and told her the apartment "looked like 
somebody was cleaning up." 
Debra Hobgood, a manager at Bob Bennett Ford, testified Portia had worked as a 
custodian for five years and was a good employee.  Hobgood described herself as 
Portia's friend and she helped Portia pick out her new car and loaned her money for 
a down payment. Hobgood stated Portia loved her car and would not let anyone 
drive it. Hobgood asserted that when Portia started dating Lynch, she began to 
have low self-esteem and was "always questioning what she did."  Hobgood gave 
Portia $650 to find a new apartment because she wanted her to get away from
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Lynch; however, at the time of the incident, Hobgood was unaware Portia was 
living with Lynch. Hobgood stated Angelica planned to attend summer camp in 
the summer of 2006 and was very excited.  According to Hobgood, she last saw 
Portia on Friday, June 9, 2006, and the last thing Portia said to her was, "I'll see 
you Monday." 
Nancy Hyler, the former office manager at Bob Bennett Ford, testified the last pay 
check issued for Portia was on June 16, 2006, but it was never picked up.  Carly 
Coviello, an employee with T-Mobile, testified the last call made from Portia's cell 
phone was at 9:26 p.m. on June 10, 2006, in West Columbia.  Steven Newnom, an 
employee at TransUnion Credit Union, testified there had been no credit inquiries 
for Portia's records.  Julia Price, of Ford Motor Credit Company, explained that 
Portia purchased a 2005 Ford Focus on June 22, 2005, pursuant to a financing 
agreement with Ford Motor Credit, and the last payment received by Ford was on 
June 12, 2006. Dawn Hurley testified Portia had checking and savings accounts 
with Bank of America.  According to Hurley, the last transaction on the savings 
account was on June 10, 2006, at 9:50 a.m., and the last transaction for the 
checking account was an automatic draft to Ford Motor Credit on June 12, 2006.  
Nicky Rodgers, an employee with Lexington County 911 who had access to a 
national database for drivers' licenses, found one driver's license for Portia and it 
was in South Carolina. James Hinton, an employee of Lexington School District 
Two, testified Angelica last attended school on June 1, 2006, which was the end of 
her second grade year. The school expected Angelica to return the next year but 
she never returned, and the school district had received no requests from other 
schools for Angelica's school transcripts.   
Ola Mathis, the former apartment manager of Portia and Lynch's apartment, stated 
that on June 13, 2006, she entered the victims' apartment and found no signs of 
forced entry, but that it had been cleaned in a way that looked "staged."  She found 
a girl's church clothes laid on one of the beds.  According to Mathis, "the only 
thing missing" from the apartment were the victims and Portia's car.  Mathis 
explained the lease for the apartment stated Lynch and Portia were married.   
Takiesha Shelton, an employee of Motel 6, testified motel records showed Lynch 
arrived at a motel in Vicksburg, Mississippi, on June 12, 2006, and departed on 
June 13, 2006. Records also showed Lynch arriving on June 14, 2006, and 
departing on June 15, 2006, at a motel in Eloy, Arizona.  One receipt listed Lynch's 
address as Florida, but a second receipt showed an address in Cayce.   
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Shane Ramirez, an officer with the Texas Highway Patrol, testified he stopped 
Lynch for speeding on June 14, 2006, in Fort Hancock, Texas.  Lynch was driving 
a 2005 Ford Focus that was registered to Portia.  There were no passengers in the 
car but there was a child's car seat in the back.  Ramirez described the car as 
"messy" like "someone had been living out of it."  Lynch informed Ramirez that he
was coming from Mississippi and was traveling to Arizona to pick up his wife.           
Agent Nathan Bresee, formerly a customs and border protection agent in Blaine, 
Washington, testified he encountered Lynch on June 17, 2006, at 10:45 p.m. at the 
United States/Canada border.  Agent Bresee explained Lynch had "refusal 
paperwork" indicating he had been refused entry into Canada.  Because Lynch had 
been refused entry into Canada, Agent Bresee performed a criminal history check 
on Lynch, which revealed a positive NCIC alert indicating Lynch was a missing 
person. Agent Bresee contacted the West Columbia Police Department (WCPD) 
as the reporting agency, and Detective April Bayne of WCPD informed him that 
Lynch was a suspect in a double homicide.  Upon learning this information, Agent 
Bresee directed border protection agents to conduct two searches of Lynch's person 
and a search of his two bags. 
Agent Bresee found several items in Lynch's possession that he faxed to WCPD, 
including a Greyhound bus ticket from Seattle, Washington, to Vancouver, 
Canada, dated June 17, 2006; a Motel 6 receipt dated June 14, 2006; and a second 
Motel 6 receipt dated June 12, 2006. Agent Bresee stated that at 3:10 a.m. on June 
18, 2006, WCPD informed him that an arrest warrant had been issued for Lynch on 
the charge of grand larceny. Agent Bresee contacted the Whatcom County, 
Washington Sheriff's Department, and a sheriff's deputy came and served Lynch 
with an arrest warrant.   
Deputy Courtney Polinder served the arrest warrant on Lynch between 4:00 a.m.
and 4:30 a.m. on June 18.  Deputy Polinder informed Lynch of his Miranda1 rights,
retrieved Lynch's property from the border protection agents, and transported 
Lynch and his property to a county jail in Washington.  On the way to jail, Deputy 
Polinder stated he did not interrogate Lynch, but Lynch made several statements.  
Lynch denied any involvement with Portia's car, which was listed in the arrest 
warrant. Lynch denied driving the vehicle to the west coast and stated he had 
traveled with a friend and then by bus.  Lynch told Deputy Polinder he was 
1Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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planning to visit Vancouver, Canada, because he wanted "to see bears," which 
Deputy Polinder explained was strange because Vancouver is an urban area and 
bears live further north. Lynch told Deputy Polinder he lived with the victims, had 
recently quit his job, left to visit Canada, and planned to return to South Carolina.   
Officer Bradley Richardson of the Seattle Police Department found Portia's car on 
June 18, 2006, near a Greyhound bus station in Seattle.  According to Officer 
Bradley, the license plates had been removed, and the car was very clean and 
looked like a rental car. Thereafter, he searched the car and found nothing inside 
the car or in the trunk. 
On June 19, 2006, Agent Brenda Wilson, of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
and Glen Hutchings, a local police officer, interviewed Lynch.  During the 
interview, Lynch stated he quit his job at Bob Bennett Ford on Friday, June 9, 
2010, but planned to return to South Carolina to attend a truck driving school.  He 
admitted he and Portia had been in a romantic relationship but claimed their 
relationship had become "more like roommates" within the last year.  Lynch stated 
he last saw Portia's car on Friday, June 10, 2006, when she drove him home from 
work. Lynch denied driving Portia's car outside of South Carolina.  He stated he 
not seen Portia since June 10th because they had decided to "go their separate 
ways." 
When Agent Wilson confronted Lynch with evidence that he had been stopped in 
Texas driving Portia's car, Lynch initially denied driving her car but then admitted 
it. He claimed Portia had allowed him to drive her car because she was in "over 
her head" with the payments.  Lynch denied knowing the victims' whereabouts and 
stated it would be out of character for Portia to disappear because she "had a habit 
of going to the beauty salon and then church."  According to Agent Wilson, Lynch 
acted "shocked" when he heard the victims were missing, and he stated he did not 
know anyone who would want to hurt them. Lynch further stated he had never 
seen other men at the apartment. When asked about Portia's car being found in 
Seattle, Lynch claimed he "just left it there and that he wanted to take the bus up to 
Canada."  Agent Wilson then contacted WCPD with the information she learned 
from the interview.   
Detective Glen Hutchings, formerly of the Bellingham, Washington Police 
Department, testified he was present during Lynch's interview with Agent Wilson.  
He claimed Lynch told him Portia was "head of maintenance" at Bob Bennett Ford 
and that Lynch "worked in the parts department."  Detective Hutchings stated 
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Lynch told him he planned to return to South Carolina to attend a 15-day truck 
driver training program with Werner Trucking Company.  Detective Hutchings 
was familiar with Werner Trucking Company because his son worked for the 
company; however, he stated they did not have a 15-day truck driver training 
program. Detective Hutchings asserted Lynch initially denied driving Portia's car 
outside South Carolina and stated he had traveled with a friend to Georgia, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, California, Oregon, and Washington.  According to 
Detective Hutchings, when Lynch was informed the victims were missing, his 
response was "very flat" and he did not ask any questions or show any emotion.  
Detective Hutchings stated Lynch claimed he left the apartment in Portia's car on 
Friday, June 10. Detective Hutchings further stated Lynch eventually admitted he 
took Portia's car without her permission, but asserted "she wouldn't have cared 
anyway because she was going to lose the car."   
On June 22, 2006, Rod Green, an agent with SLED, arrived in Seattle where he 
processed Portia's car pursuant to a search warrant.  Green stated the car was empty 
and the glove box contained no vehicle registration, proof of insurance, or any 
other paperwork. Green did not find any blood, but he found three fingerprints that 
belonged to Lynch.  Green also took a DNA swab from the steering wheel, which 
was later determined to belong to Lynch.   
On August 3, 2006, Detective Matt Edwards of WCPD went to Washington and 
transported Lynch back to South Carolina.  When he arrived, Detective Edwards 
took possession of Lynch's two pieces of luggage and transported them to WCPD.  
Investigator Charles Bramlett testified WCPD later obtained a search warrant for 
the two bags, and he conducted a search of the bags on September 25, 2006.  The 
following items were found in Lynch's luggage:  binoculars; banking documents; 
old receipts; a wallet; letters; a Greyhound bus ticket dated June 17, 2006; motel 
receipts; a raffle ticket; tax documents; torn notebook paper with phone numbers; 
business cards; two sets of keys; a Family Dollar receipt for toiletries dated June 
13, 2006; a pay stub; an old traffic ticket; a South Carolina lottery ticket dated June 
10, 2006; a car title; documentation from the Canadian border; jewelry; and 
clothing. 
James Sullivan of WCPD conducted a photographic comparison of the key to 
Portia's car that Jones claimed Portia gave her, a key recovered from Lynch's 
luggage, and a key created using Portia's car's VIN.  He concluded the keys had the 
same cuts.  Additionally, Sullivan compared two sets of house and mailbox keys 
found on Lynch and concluded the keys had the same cuts as those for the victims'
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apartment.  Sullivan, however, was unsuccessful in his attempt to use the house 
key on the apartment door.
Robin Taylor, a DNA analyst from SLED, took DNA samples from Theresa 
Brown, Angelica's mother, and Sallie Jones, Portia's mother.  Taylor confirmed the 
DNA taken from the steering wheel of Portia's car matched Lynch.  Taylor also 
took DNA samples from the hall bathroom of the apartment and determined that 
Lynch could not be excluded as a contributor.  Taylor explained that a section of 
the carpet seized from the apartment tested positive for blood and was a mixture of 
at least two individuals' DNA.  The major contributor was consistent with a 
daughter of Brown. At the time the victims disappeared, Brown had only one 
daughter—Angelica. The minor contributor was a male, and Lynch could not be 
excluded as the contributor. Blood was also found on the bottom of a green chair 
in the apartment, on the master bedroom sink, and on a blue container found in the 
apartment.  All three of these samples contained a mixture of DNA, with the major 
contributor being a daughter of Brown. Swabs from a different area of the green 
chair, carpet, and master bedroom door tested positive for blood and the DNA 
profiles were consistent with a daughter of Brown.  Blood was also recovered on 
two other areas of the carpet and five sections of a sheet found near the green chair 
with the DNA being from a daughter of Brown.   
Steven Derrick, an expert in blood stain analysis, analyzed the blood stains found 
in the apartment.  Derrick opined the right arm of the green chair showed a 
"broken" droplet of blood with a transfer stain going down the arm.  He concluded 
the three distinctive lines of blood going down the arm were made by three fingers 
making contact with the chair. The undercarriage of the green chair showed 
multiple patterns, including drops, transfers, and smears.  The wood portion of the 
undercarriage of the green chair was broken, and Derrick found what he called a 
"hair transfer pattern" of blood.  He opined the spatter was caused by a medium 
range of force based upon the size of the droplets, which was caused by a fist or 
other blunt object.  Derrick further opined the chair was not upright when the blood 
spatter was distributed on the chair.  In the hair transfer pattern, Derrick found a 
"conglomerate of blood" that indicated a wound in the hairline where bloodletting 
had occurred. Based upon his analysis of the blood, Derrick opined that 
"something other than a natural incident" occurred in the apartment, specifically an 
"act of violence."  Derrick, however, admitted he could not determine when the 
incident occurred. 
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Detective Bayne testified WCPD conducted numerous investigations to locate the 
victims, with the help of SLED and the Secret Service, but they were unable to find 
them.  Detective Bayne explained their investigation revealed that Lynch had 
stayed in a Motel 6 in Vicksburg, Mississippi, where he provided a false address.  
She contacted the Werner Trucking Company and they confirmed they did not 
have a truck driver training school in South Carolina.  Detective Bayne explained 
that neither Lynch nor Portia picked up their last paychecks from Bob Bennett 
Ford, and no school district in the country had requested Angelica's school records.   
On cross-examination, Detective Bayne testified regarding WCPD's failure to 
follow-up on tips indicating potential sightings of the victims.  For example, a 
patron at a local ice cream shop claimed she saw "a black female and a little girl 
that matched the description . . . of [the victims]."  Although WCPD followed up 
on the lead and inquired if the shop had video, no one spoke to the patron until six 
years later. WCPD also took a statement from one of Angelica's teachers who told 
police in 2006 that Angelica informed him in May 2006 that she was going to 
Texas; however, WCPD did not follow-up on this lead.  In addition, a truck driver
claimed he saw a "black female, possibly 50/50 of that being [Portia]" at a truck 
stop. The trucker said the woman approached him asking for help because she had 
been left at the truck stop by her boyfriend.  Although the trucker was unsure of the 
exact date and city, he believed it was the week of June 17, 2006, at a truck stop 
near El Paso, Texas.  Finally, Detective Bayne admitted WCPD did not follow up 
on six leads received from the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children 
even though five of the leads indicated sightings in California and one was for a 
sighting on an Amtrak between Seattle and Portland.     
B. Lynch's Defense 
Lynch presented the testimony of Rebecca Kilbride, a teacher at Angelica's school, 
who stated Lynch picked up Angelica from school two or three times per week.  
Additionally, George Mook, an employee at Bob Bennett Ford, stated he saw 
Lynch driving Portia's car "once in a while."  Detective Page Moore of WCPD 
confirmed that a witness claimed to have seen the victims at an ice cream shop in 
Lexington County; however, WCPD waited six years to contact her.  Matt Martin, 
an investigator for the State, testified that a credit report for Angelica's social 
security number showed a collection report for an unpaid credit balance under the 
name of "Sandra Livingston."  The collection was for an unpaid medical bill in 
California in October 2008. 
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Dr. Kimberly Collins, an expert in forensic pathology, reviewed the photographs 
from the apartment and found no indication of dragging down the hallway of the 
apartment.  According to Dr. Collins, the photos indicated there was no significant 
volume of blood to soak through the carpet because neither the bottom of the 
carpet nor the padding had blood on them.  She was unable to form an opinion as 
to the quantity of blood on the green chair, finding it medically and scientifically 
impossible.  She was also unable to determine the type of injury that may have 
occurred, how the injury happened, or the severity of the injury.     
Following the bench trial, Lynch was convicted of one count of grand larceny and 
two counts of murder.  The trial court sentenced him to ten years' imprisonment for 
grand larceny and life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the 
murders.  This appeal followed. 
LAW/ANALYSIS  
I. Directed Verdict
Lynch argues the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict 
because the State failed to present substantial circumstantial evidence that he killed 
the victims, that he was present at the scene of the crime, and that he stole Portia's
car. We disagree.2 
"On appeal from the denial of a directed verdict, [the appellate court] must view 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the State."  State v. Odems, 395 S.C. 
582, 586, 720 S.E.2d 48, 50 (2011). "[I]f there is any direct or substantial
circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused, an 
appellate court must find the case was properly submitted to the jury."  Id.
"A defendant is entitled to a directed verdict when the State fails to produce 
evidence of the offense charged."   State v. Pearson, 410 S.C. 392, 398, 764 S.E.2d 
706, 710 (Ct. App. 2014), cert granted (internal quotation marks omitted).  "The 
State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the identity of the 
defendant as the person who committed the charged crime or crimes."  Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Schrock, 283 S.C. 129, 133, 322 S.E.2d 
450, 452 (1984) (stating the State has the burden of proving "the accused was at 
the scene of the crime when it happened and that he committed the criminal act").  
2 At trial, Lynch conceded that the victims were murdered by criminal means. 
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"If there is substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the 
defendant's guilt, an appellate court must find the trial court properly submitted the 
case to the jury." Pearson, 410 S.C. at 399, 764 S.E.2d at 710.  "The [trial] court 
should not refuse to grant the motion where the evidence merely raises a suspicion 
that the accused is guilty." State v. Mitchell, 341 S.C. 406, 409, 535 S.E.2d 126, 
127 (2000). 
In State v. Arnold, our supreme court held fingerprint evidence placing Arnold 
with the victim on the day of the murder was not substantial and merely raised a 
suspicion of Arnold's guilt.  361 S.C. 386, 390, 605 S.E.2d 529, 531 (2004).  In 
Arnold, the victim's body was discovered off a dirt road in Colleton County.  Id. at 
388, 605 S.E.2d at 530. The victim was last seen alive three days earlier, when he 
borrowed a friend's BMW to go to a dentist appointment.  Id. One of the State's 
witnesses testified he had introduced the victim to Arnold.  Id. The witness 
indicated he had received a message from Arnold to call him at a phone number 
belonging to Arnold's father, who lived in Gray, Tennessee.  Id. at 389, 605 S.E.2d 
at 530. The borrowed BMW was later found in a parking lot in Johnson City, 
Tennessee, approximately ten miles away from where Arnold's father lived.  Id. 
The BMW had unspecified scratches on it, and a coffee cup lid containing Arnold's 
fingerprint was found in the car's center console.  Id. In concluding that the 
circumstantial evidence presented by the State was not sufficient to overcome a 
directed verdict motion, the court reasoned:
Viewing the evidence most favorably to the State, 
[Arnold]'s fingerprint on the coffee cup lid tab establishes 
he was in the borrowed BMW on the same day the victim
was last seen alive. The fact that the BMW was found 
abandoned in Tennessee, the same state where [Arnold] 
was located after his stay in Savannah, raises a suspicion 
of guilt but is not evidence that [Arnold] killed [the 
victim]. Further, there is no evidence [Arnold] was at the 
scene of the crime, which according to the State's theory 
was in Colleton County. 
Id. at 390, 605 S.E.2d at 531 (footnote omitted). 
The trial court did not err in denying the motion for a directed verdict because, 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, there was substantial 
circumstantial evidence of Lynch's guilt.  See Odems, 395 S.C. at 586, 720 S.E.2d 
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at 50 (recognizing that "[o]n appeal from the denial of a directed verdict, [the 
appellate court] must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State"); 
id. ("[I]f there is any direct or substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably 
tending to prove the guilt of the accused, an appellate court must find the case was 
properly submitted to the jury.").  As to grand larceny, multiple witnesses testified 
Portia loved her car and would not allow anyone to drive it.  In particular, Jones 
stated Portia gave her the spare set of keys to the car because she did not want 
Lynch driving it. In addition, Lynch was stopped for speeding while driving 
Portia's car alone in Texas, and according to Detective Hutchings, Lynch later 
admitted that he took Portia's car without her permission.  Although Lynch 
presented evidence that he had previously driven Portia's car with her permission, 
this goes to the weight of the evidence.    
As to the victims' murders, the State presented evidence that Lynch was the last 
person seen with the victims at the place where the State alleged the murders 
occurred. See State v. Williams, 303 S.C. 274, 276, 400 S.E.2d 131, 132-33 (1991) 
(finding "substantial evidence" to prove the defendant's guilt when the victim was 
employed by the defendant, was last seen alive with the defendant, and the victim's
decomposed body was found); cf. State v. Lane, 406 S.C. 118, 120, 749 S.E.2d 
165, 167 (Ct. App. 2013), reversed by 410 S.C. 505, 765 S.E.2d 557 (2014) (per 
curiam) (finding the State failed to present substantial circumstantial evidence that 
the defendant was guilty of burglary when papers with the defendant's name were 
found at the crime scene and a car similar to the defendant's was seen in the 
victim's driveway when the crime occurred).  This is an important distinction from
Arnold where the victim was last seen alone at his office, and although Arnold's 
fingerprint was found in the victim's car, there was no evidence Arnold was at the 
scene of the crime.  Moreover, Lynch admitted to police he last saw Portia on 
Friday June 9, 2006—the day before the State alleged the murder occurred.  In 
addition, the State presented forensic evidence that an assault occurred at the 
apartment where Lynch lived with the victims.  Lynch also admitted to police that 
he did not know anyone that wanted to harm the victims.  Other damaging 
evidence included the fact that a male's DNA was found in the victims' apartment, 
and Lynch told police that he had not seen other males in the apartment.   
Importantly, the State also presented substantial evidence of flight, which further 
distinguishes this case from the cases Lynch relies on in his brief.  See State v. 
Ballenger, 322 S.C. 196, 200, 470 S.E.2d 851, 854 (1996) ([F]light . . . is at least 
some evidence of guilt."); State v. Pagan, 369 S.C. 201, 209, 631 S.E.2d 262, 266 
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(2006) ("Flight evidence is relevant when there is a nexus between the flight and 
the offense charged."). As previously stated, when Lynch was stopped for 
speeding in Texas two days after the victims were last seen, he was driving Portia's 
car and he told the officer he was traveling to Arizona to see his wife, although he 
was not married. He checked into hotels in multiple states over a short period 
where he paid cash, once using a false address.  He was stopped while trying to 
enter Canada a few days later, claiming he wanted to visit Vancouver to "see 
bears." He also repeatedly lied to police officers, initially claiming he had not 
driven Portia's car outside South Carolina and only admitting to it after he was 
confronted with evidence of his traffic stop in Texas.  Finally, the State presented 
evidence that Lynch abandoned Portia's car in Seattle, removing the license plate 
and all identification. See State v. Beckham, 334 S.C. 302, 314, 513 S.E.2d 606, 
612 (1999) ("The attempted destruction of evidence is regarded as a relevant 
incriminating circumstance.").  Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to 
the State, the evidence rose above mere suspicion and constituted substantial 
circumstantial evidence to prove Lynch was guilty of grand larceny of Portia's car 
and the victims' murders.  Cf. Mitchell, 341 S.C. at 409, 535 S.E.2d at 127 
(recognizing a motion for directed verdict should be granted "where the evidence 
merely raises a suspicion that the accused is guilty").  Accordingly, the trial court 
did not err in denying Lynch's motion for a directed verdict.         
II. Jury Instruction 
Lynch next argues the trial court erred in not giving a jury instruction regarding 
how to use and evaluate circumstantial evidence.3  We disagree. 
"An appellate court will not reverse the trial [court]'s decision regarding a jury 
charge absent an abuse of discretion."  State v. Commander, 396 S.C. 254, 270, 
721 S.E.2d 413, 421-22 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).  "To warrant 
reversal, a trial [court]'s refusal to give a requested jury charge must be both 
erroneous and prejudicial to the defendant."  Id. at 270, 721 S.E.2d at 422 (internal
quotation marks omitted).  "A jury charge which is substantially correct and covers 
the law does not require reversal." State v. Brandt, 393 S.C. 526, 549, 713 S.E.2d 
591, 603 (2011). 
3 Because Lynch received a bench trial, he did not actually request a jury 
instruction; rather, he requested the trial court consider the "correct" law when 
evaluating whether there was substantial circumstantial evidence of guilt.    
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At the conclusion of the case, the parties engaged in a charge conference to discuss 
the standards the trial court would use to evaluate the evidence.  Lynch moved for 
a circumstantial evidence charge found in State v. Edwards;4 specifically, that "in a 
circumstantial evidence case, if the factfinder w[ere] to view any story that was 
plausible without the absence of direct evidence, they should find him not guilty.  
Circumstantial evidence has to be complete."     
Lynch argued that due to the nature of a capital proceeding, where the Eighth 
Amendment required heightened reliability, the appropriate charge would be "the 
old Edwards standard, which is any exception that would tend to disprove the case 
is sufficient to defeat the case." The trial court stated it would not "charge 
something that [was] not the law" and denied Lynch's request.   
In Edwards, the supreme court approved the following charge as part of an 
appropriate circumstantial evidence charge: 
every circumstance relied upon by the State [must] be 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt; and . . . all of the 
circumstances so proven [must] be consistent with each 
other and taken together, point conclusively to the guilt 
of the accused to the exclusion of every other reasonable 
hypothesis. It is not sufficient that they create a 
probability, though a strong one and if, assuming then to 
be true they may be accounted for upon any reasonable 
hypothesis which does not include the guilt of the 
accused, the proof has failed. 
298 S.C. at 85, 489 S.E.2d at 465 (quoting State v. Littlejohn, 228 S.C. 324, 328, 
89 S.E.2d 924, 926 (1955) (alteration in original)). 
In State v. Grippon, our supreme court found the trial court did not err when it 
refused to charge the phrase "to the exclusion of every other reasonable 
hypothesis" in its circumstantial evidence jury charge.  327 S.C. 79, 82, 489 S.E.2d 
462, 463 (1997), abrogated by State v. Cherry, 361 S.C. 588, 606 S.E.2d 475 
(2004). The supreme court held that in a criminal case relying in whole or in part 
4 298 S.C. 272, 379 S.E.2d 888 (1989), abrogated by State v. Logan, 405 S.C. 83, 
747 S.E.2d 444 (2013). 
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on circumstantial evidence, once a proper reasonable doubt instruction is given, the 
jury should be instructed as follows: 
There are two types of evidence which are generally 
presented during a trial—direct evidence and 
circumstantial evidence.  Direct evidence is the testimony 
of a person who asserts or claims to have actual 
knowledge of a fact, such as an eyewitness. 
Circumstantial evidence is proof of a chain of facts and 
circumstances indicating the existence of a fact.  The law 
makes absolutely no distinction between the weight or 
value to be given to either direct or circumstantial 
evidence. Nor is a greater degree of certainty required of 
circumstantial evidence than of direct evidence.  You 
should weigh all the evidence in the case.  After 
weighing all the evidence, if you are not convinced of the 
guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, you 
must find [the defendant] not guilty.
Id. at 83-84, 489 S.E.2d at 464. 
Justice Toal wrote a concurrence, finding no reason to adopt an entirely new 
circumstantial evidence charge and recommending trial courts not abandon "South
Carolina's traditional charge as described in State v. Edwards." Id. at 84-85, 489 
S.E.2d at 464-65 (Toal, J., concurring).  Justice Toal opined juries need "detailed 
information about the relation of circumstantial evidence to determination of guilt" 
and "the Edwards charge clarifies the jury's responsibility to evaluate 
circumstantial evidence carefully."  Id. at 88, 489 S.E.2d at 466-67. 
In State v. Cherry, the defendant argued the trial court erred in refusing to give the 
Edwards charge. 361 S.C. at 595, 606 S.E.2d at 478-79.  The supreme court 
disagreed, holding "Grippon is the sole remaining charge to be utilized by the 
courts of this state in instructing juries in cases relying, in whole or in part, on 
circumstantial evidence." Id. at 597, 606 S.E.2d at 480. Specifically, the court 
found, 
[T]he reasonable hypothesis charge merely serves to 
confuse juries by leading them to believe that the 
standard for measuring circumstantial evidence is 
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 different than that for measuring direct evidence when, in 
fact, it is not.  The standard remains whether the evidence 
reflects proof of the defendant's guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we hold that the 
recommended language in Grippon is the sole and 
exclusive charge to be given in circumstantial evidence 
cases in this state, along with a proper reasonable doubt 
instruction. 
Id. at 601, 606 S.E.2d at 482 (footnotes omitted).     
In State v. Logan, the supreme court held trial courts should provide the following 
language as a circumstantial evidence charge, in addition to a proper reasonable 
doubt instruction, when requested by the defendant: 
There are two types of evidence which are generally 
presented during a trial—direct evidence and 
circumstantial evidence.  Direct evidence directly proves 
the existence of a fact and does not require deduction.  
Circumstantial evidence is proof of a chain of facts and 
circumstances indicating the existence of a fact. 
Crimes may be proven by circumstantial evidence.  The 
law makes no distinction between the weight or value to 
be given to either direct or circumstantial evidence, 
however, to the extent the State relies on circumstantial 
evidence, all of the circumstances must be consistent 
with each other, and when taken together, point 
conclusively to the guilt of the accused beyond a 
reasonable doubt. If these circumstances merely portray 
the defendant's behavior as suspicious, the proof has 
failed. 
The State has the burden of proving the defendant guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt. This burden rests with the 
State regardless of whether the State relies on direct 
evidence, circumstantial evidence, or some combination 
of the two. 
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405 S.C. at 99, 747 S.E.2d at 452. The court further noted, "This holding does not 
prevent the trial court from issuing the circumstantial evidence charge provided in 
Grippon and Cherry. However, trial courts may not exclusively rely on that charge 
over a defendant's objection."  Id. at 100, 747 S.E.2d at 452-53. Nevertheless, the 
Logan court ultimately concluded any error in the trial court's jury instructions was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the trial court "clearly instructed the 
jury regarding the reasonable doubt burden of proof" and its jury instruction, "as a 
whole, properly conveyed the applicable law."  Id. at 94 n.8, 747 S.E.2d at 449 n.8 
(citations omitted).   
The trial court did not err in refusing to issue Lynch's requested jury charge.  
Initially, we note that the State v. Logan decision applies to this case because 
Lynch's direct appeal was pending when Logan was released.  See State v. Jenkins, 
408 S.C. 560, 572, 759 S.E.2d 759, 765 (Ct. App. 2014), cert pending (finding 
Logan applies to cases "pending on appeal at the time the Logan opinion was 
published"). Nevertheless, we believe Lynch's argument is without merit because 
his requested circumstantial charge was based on the "reasonable hypothesis" 
language from Edwards, which the supreme court found unnecessary in Logan. 
See Logan, 405 S.C. at 99, 747 S.E.2d at 452; Jenkins, 408 S.C. at 572-73, 759 
S.E.2d at 766 ("Our supreme court has excluded the 'reasonable hypothesis'
language from the circumstantial evidence instruction now required by Logan, 
recognizing that this language is unnecessary.").  Therefore, the trial court did not 
commit reversible error in refusing Lynch's requested charge.  See State v. 
Drayton, Op. No. 5294 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Feb. 4, 2015) (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 
5 at 48, 51) (finding no reversible error in trial court's failure to include the 
Edwards "reasonable hypothesis" language in its circumstantial evidence jury 
charge when the trial court's instruction "as a whole, properly conveyed the 
applicable law"). 
III. Search and Seizure 
Lynch next argues the trial court erred in not suppressing evidence seized in 
connection with his arrest because his arrest warrant for grand larceny was not 
supported by probable cause.  Relying on Franks v. Delaware,5 Lynch argues the 
officer who obtained the arrest warrant for grand larceny failed to inform the 
magistrate that Lynch and Portia were in a relationship, had lived together, and that 
Lynch had previously driven Portia's car. He asserts that but for these omissions, 
5 438 U.S. 154 (1978). 
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the arrest warrant for grand larceny would not have been supported by probable 
cause. We disagree.   
"There is . . . a presumption of validity with respect to the affidavit supporting the 
search warrant."  Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978). In Franks, the 
Supreme Court of the United States held the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments 
gave a defendant the right in certain circumstances to challenge the veracity of a 
warrant affidavit after the warrant had been issued and executed.  Id. at 155-56.   
To be entitled to a Franks hearing for an alleged 
omission, the challenger must make a preliminary 
showing that the information in question was omitted 
with the intent to make, or in reckless disregard of 
whether it made, the affidavit misleading to the issuing 
judge. There will be no Franks violation if the affidavit, 
including the omitted data, still contains sufficient 
information to establish probable cause. 
State v. Missouri, 337 S.C. 548, 554, 524 S.E.2d 394, 397 (1999) (footnote 
omitted).  "Franks addressed an act of commission in which false information had 
been included in the warrant affidavit.  However, the Franks test also applies to 
acts of omission in which exculpatory material is left out of the affidavit."  Id.
"Entitlement to a Franks hearing is a matter of law subject to de novo review."  
Horton v. City of Columbia, 408 S.C. 27, 36, 757 S.E.2d 537, 541 (Ct. App. 2014), 
cert granted. 
While omissions may not be per se immune from
inquiry, the affirmative inclusion of false information in 
an affidavit is more likely to present a question of 
impermissible official conduct than a failure to include a 
matter that might be construed as exculpatory.  This latter 
situation potentially opens officers to endless conjecture 
about investigative leads, fragments of information, or 
other matter that might, if included, have redounded to 
defendant's benefit. The potential for endless rounds of 
Franks hearings to contest facially sufficient warrants is 
readily apparent. 
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United States v. Colkley, 899 F.2d 297, 301 (4th Cir.1990) (citations omitted).   
A party attempting to demonstrate information was intentionally or recklessly 
omitted from an affidavit bears a heavy burden of proof.  United States v. Tate, 524 
F.3d 449, 454 (4th Cir. 2008).  "[T]he omission must be 'designed to mislead ' or 
must be made 'in reckless disregard of whether [it] would mislead.'" Id. at 455 
(citation omitted) (emphasis removed) (second alteration in original).  "The 
defendant must also show that the omitted material was necessary to the finding of 
probable cause, i.e., that the omitted material was such that its inclusion in the 
affidavit would defeat probable cause." United States v. Shorter, 328 F.3d 167, 
170 (4th Cir. 2003) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  "Upon 
making this two-part preliminary showing, a defendant is entitled to a hearing, at 
which he bears the burden of proving the allegations by a preponderance of the 
evidence." Id.  "If a Franks hearing is appropriate and an affiant's material perjury 
or recklessness is established by a preponderance of the evidence, the warrant 
'must be voided' and evidence or testimony gathered pursuant to it must be 
excluded." Colkley, 899 F.2d at 300.
A. Border Search
During Lynch's detention at the United States/Canada border, Agent Bresee found 
several items in Lynch's possession, including a Greyhound bus ticket from Seattle 
to Vancouver dated June 17, 2006; a Motel 6 receipt dated June 14, 2006; and a 
second Motel 6 receipt dated June 12, 2006.  Agent Bresee faxed copies of these 
items to WCPD, and at 3:10 a.m. on June 18, 2006, WCPD confirmed to him that 
an arrest warrant had been issued for Lynch on the charge of grand larceny.  Agent 
Bresee then called the Whatcom County, Washington Sheriff's Department to take 
Lynch into custody, and a sheriff's deputy served Lynch with an arrest warrant for 
grand larceny. 
Following Bresee's testimony, Lynch moved to suppress the seizure of the 
documents by the border patrol agents and their subsequent transfer to WCPD.  
Lynch, however, conceded that he did not "have a problem with the Border Patrol 
agent checking into [Lynch].  There's an NCIC for a missing person.  He checks 
his bags. If he checked them at that point, that's okay, too."  The trial court denied 
Lynch's motion to suppress, finding the documents were seized lawfully under the 
border exception to the Fourth Amendment and that the documents were lawfully 
transmitted to WCPD "because they were seized properly and lawfully under the 
Border Patrol's authority." 
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  Initially, we note that the trial court did not err in refusing to suppress the items
seized by the border patrol. Lynch conceded the initial search of his bags by the 
border patrol was valid; therefore, any argument that his initial search was 
unlawful is unpreserved. Even if the argument is preserved, it is without merit 
because the contents of Lynch's luggage were lawfully seized under the border 
exception to the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 
616 (1977) ("[S]earches made at the border, pursuant to the long-standing right of 
the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and examining persons and property 
crossing into this country, are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they 
occur at the border . . . ."). Furthermore, once the items were properly seized by 
the border patrol agents, the agents could fax copies of those items to WCPD.  See 
Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 n.5 (1983) ("[W]here law enforcement 
authorities are cooperating in an investigation, . . . the knowledge of one is 
presumed shared by all."); State v. Muquit, 381 S.C. 114, 118, 671 S.E.2d 643, 645 
(Ct. App. 2009) ("When an arrestee's property is already in the custody of law 
enforcement as an incident of the arrest, the police may seize it at a later time as 
evidence relating to his offense.").  Therefore, the trial court did not err in refusing 
to suppress the items seized during Lynch's search at the border.   
B. Arrest Warrant/Franks Hearing 
Lynch next moved to suppress any evidence seized from him after his arrest for 
grand larceny, arguing his arrest warrant for grand larceny was invalid.  Detective 
Matt Edwards of WCPD testified he procured Lynch's arrest warrant for grand 
larceny on June 18, 2006. Detective Edwards supplemented the affidavit for the 
warrant with sworn testimony to the magistrate.  He orally "reiterated that [WCPD] 
knew the vehicle belonged to Portia, and Portia alone, through [the] DMV," that 
Lynch "would not have been allowed to take the vehicle at any time" based upon 
conversations with coworkers and family, that Lynch lied to the trooper in Texas 
when he said he was going to pick up his wife in Arizona because Lynch was 
unmarried, and that Lynch showed up in Washington alone.   
On cross-examination, Detective Edwards testified he "passed on to [the 
magistrate] . . . what had been openly discussed . . . by coworkers and family, that 
[Lynch] would not have been allowed to" drive Portia's car.  He further stated that 
at that time, he had not talked to Portia's mother and he "had seen no documents 
that indicated [Lynch and Portia] were husband and wife."  Detective Edwards 
admitted he did not tell the magistrate (1) that Lynch and Portia had lived together 
62 

  
 
in different residences for two years, (2) that they had an intimate relationship, and 
(3) that Portia was Lynch's live-in girlfriend.   
Thereafter, Lynch argued Detective Edwards's omissions of information in the 
process of obtaining the warrant rendered the warrant defective.  Lynch asserted 
the manner the warrant was presented to the magistrate implied that Lynch was a 
"random person" driving Portia's car when in fact he was her live-in boyfriend who 
had previously driven her car with permission.  Specifically, Lynch argued that 
Detective Edwards failed to inform the magistrate that Lynch was driving a car that 
belonged to his live-in girlfriend of two years and that coworkers and family 
members informed police that Lynch would occasionally drive Portia's car.   
The trial court ruled that even with the omitted information—that Lynch and the 
victim had been in a relationship but the relationship was troubled—the arrest 
warrant still was supported by probable cause. It found that "based upon the 
information that [WCPD] detectives had at that time," the information they 
presented to the magistrate was sufficient to establish probable cause.  The court 
acknowledged that "certain facts [were] left out"; however, it denied any motion to 
suppress based on the allegation that the arrest warrant was not supported by 
probable cause. 
Lynch has failed to show a Franks violation. First, Detective Edwards did not 
recklessly or intentionally omit the information that was not relayed to the 
magistrate. See Missouri, 337 S.C. at 554, 524 S.E.2d at 397 ("To be entitled to a 
Franks hearing for an alleged omission, the challenger must make a preliminary 
showing that the information in question was omitted with the intent to make, or in 
reckless disregard of whether it made, the affidavit misleading to the issuing 
judge."). Lynch asserts that Detective Edwards recklessly or intentionally failed to 
inform the magistrate that Jones had seen Lynch driving Portia's car; however 
Detective Edwards testified that at the time he obtained the warrant, he had not 
spoken with Jones; therefore, he could not have conveyed this information to the 
magistrate. In addition, Detective Edwards stated that at that time, he "had seen no
documents that indicated [Lynch and Portia] were husband and wife."  Thus, he 
could not have informed the magistrate that Lynch and Portia's apartment lease 
indicated they were married.  Accordingly, Lynch has not shown a Franks
violation because he failed to make a preliminary showing that Detective Edwards 
intentionally or recklessly omitted the alleged exculpatory information.      
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Even if Detective Edwards acted recklessly in omitting this information, Lynch has 
still failed to show a Franks violation because the affidavit, including the omitted 
information, and Detective Edwards's oral testimony before the magistrate 
provided probable cause that Lynch was guilty of grand larceny.  See id. ("There 
will be no Franks violation if the affidavit, including the omitted data, still contains 
sufficient information to establish probable cause.").  The arrest warrant affidavit 
stated: 
[Detective Edwards] further state[s] that there is probable 
cause to believe that [Lynch] did commit [grand larceny]
and that probable cause is based on the following facts:   
In that on or about June 14th, 2006, at 200 N. 12th Street, 
in the city of West Columbia, County and State aforesaid, 
[the victims] were reported missing to the West 
Columbia Police Department.  They had not been seen by 
anyone since June 10, 2006.  On June 14th, 2006[,]
[Lynch] was ticketed in El Paso, Texas, while driving 
alone in a 2005 Ford Focus (VIN Number 
1FAFP34N25W228072) valued at $12,000.00 which is 
registered to [Portia].  On June 18, 2006, [Lynch] was 
stopped while trying to cross the USA/Canadian [b]order 
on a bus. The whereabouts of the vehicle are unknown.  
Investigators with [WCPD] believe that [Lynch] did take, 
steal, and carry away the vehicle depriving the owner of 
its use and value. All of which constitutes the crime of 
grand larceny more than $5000.00 and is in violation of
the South Carolina Code of Laws of 1976 as Amended. 
In addition, Detective Edwards properly supplemented the affidavit with sworn 
oral testimony before the magistrate.  See State v. Crane, 296 S.C. 336, 338, 372 
S.E.2d 587, 588 (1988) ("[A] search warrant affidavit insufficient in itself to 
establish probable cause may be supplemented before a magistrate by sworn oral 
testimony.").  Specifically, he told the magistrate "that [WCPD] knew the vehicle 
belonged to Portia, and Portia alone, through [the] DMV," that Lynch "would not 
have been allowed to take the vehicle at any time" based upon conversations with 
coworkers and family, that Lynch lied to the trooper in Texas when he said he was 
going to pick up his wife in Arizona because Lynch was unmarried, and that Lynch 
showed up in Washington alone.  Even including the omitted information that 
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 Lynch and Portia were in an intimate relationship and had been living together for 
several years, the information would have also revealed that the relationship was 
troubled. Moreover, the omitted information would not have explained or negated 
the fact that at the time WCPD sought the arrest warrant, Portia had been reported 
missing for four days, and Lynch had been stopped in Texas alone driving a car 
that was registered to Portia. While evidence of a prior relationship might have 
offered an innocent explanation for Lynch's use of Portia's car, the exculpatory 
impact of this evidence was greatly diminished by the fact that Lynch was seen 
driving the car alone in Texas, and he arrived in Washington by bus without Portia.  
Further, the magistrate would have still known that the vehicle had not been 
located, and DMV records indicated that the vehicle belonged to Portia.  
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in not suppressing evidence seized during 
Lynch's arrest because the arrest warrant was valid and supported by probable 
cause. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the trial court is 
AFFIRMED.   
SHORT and McDONALD, JJ., concur.   
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